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“Down with the Monarchy”: Iran’s Republican Moment of August 1953 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of this article is to explore and analyze Iran’s “Republican Moment” of 16-19 
August 1953, arguably the last concerted effort to abolish the monarchy and establish a 
republican order in the county prior to the Revolution of 1978-79. By drawing on a broad range 
of primary source material that have thus far remained relatively understudied by existing 
scholarship, such as the political press of those crucial days, the essay will attempt to shed light 
on a number of significant domestic developments which impacted the outcome of the actual 
coup of 19 August 1953.  Further attempt will be made to explain the importance of calls in 
favor of the Republic and the Premier Mosaddeq refusal to take heed of them. The paper will 
also explore the diverse origins of the Republican platform and its impact on both the urban 
crowd as well as on the political elite. 
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Introduction 
 
 The coup d’état of 19 August 1953 against Mohammad Mosaddeq is almost universally 
considered as a watershed moment in the contemporary political history of Iran. The sudden 
removal from power of the prime minister of the time has been etched into the collective 
memory of successive generations of Iranians and has been the subject of considerable 
attention by scholarly and popular writers alike. Following the publication in 2000 by the New 
York Times of an internal account of the coup produced by the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
main planner Donald Wilber, the attention has mainly shifted to the onerous topic of the extent 
to which the successful ejection from power of Mosaddeq was due to the intervention of the 
CIA and British intelligence.1 
  Notwithstanding the importance of ongoing research on such dimensions of the coup, this 
redirection has also been conducive to lesser focus on the internal developments which 
immediately predated that fateful day. As noted recently by Rahnema, “The historiography of 
the Mosaddeq era, let alone the overthrow of Mosaddeq, is in its infancy, as is our knowledge 
of this period.”2  One such instance which deserves further analysis consists of a disjoined set 
of initiatives which took place between 16 and 19 August 1953 which had at its core the 
dissolution of the monarchical state system and its replacement with a republican one. As this 
study will show, these initiatives, which are here collectively referred to as the “Republican 
Moment”, were brought about by a significant segment of the political spectrum in the heady 
period following the Shāh’s departure abroad on 16 August and the second successful attempt 
to unseat Mosaddeq three days later. Seen within the context of longer term political 
development, the Moment marked the last overt and popularly-participated domestic attempt to 
bring about the creation of a republic prior to the Revolution of 1978-79.  
 The republican initiatives which are at the heart of the present study have been variously 
depicted in the contemporary press, the memoirs of political figures and actors of the time and 
have also formed part of the prosecution’s argument in the trial proceedings against Mosaddeq 
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and his allies and supporters.3  The aim of this article is to bring together this disparate sources, 
assess the validity of oft-mentioned claims regarding the posture of key figures with regards to 
the republican initiatives and provide a focused study of the Moment. It will also assess its 
importance in the broader evolution of those complex and event-ridden days, particularly with 
regards to principal actors such as the Tudeh Party’s leadership and Mosaddeq himself. It will 
argue in particular that the calls to establish a republic had a decisive impact on the prime 
minister’s decision to order his supporters off the streets on the afternoon of 18 August, which 
in turn greatly favoured the second, successful coup attempt of the following day. 
  The Republican Moment of 16-19 August 1953 also marks the culmination of a complex 
process of institutional confrontation which had been ongoing, as will be discussed briefly 
below, for most of Mosaddeq’s prime ministerial tenure. The concluding part of this process 
was marked by the unique power vacuum which came about on the morning of 16 August 
1953, when both government and society had to contend with the absence of the Shāh and the 
lack of clear legal provisions to deal with the unprecedented situation. These factors favoured 
the emergence of proposals which had been rarely, if ever, floated during Mosaddeq’s 
premiership and which extended beyond the institutional boundaries of the constitutional 
(mashruteh) state order. Similarly to the more extended episode of 1924, the Republican 
initiatives of 1953 came about at a time of severe weakness of the monarchical institution and 
emerged on the cusp of societal incitement for a transition to a new state system.4  
 The Republican Moment has been subject to little in-depth academic scrutiny. It is largely 
missing from major accounts of the coup, such as Gasiorowski’s seminal 1987 account of the 
CIA’s involvement, Ervand Abrahamian’s Iran Between Two Revolutions and the more recent 
The Coup and Katouzian’s Musadiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran. Fakhreddin Azimi’s 
profound analyses of the process to remove Mosaddeq from power mention only in passing the 
attitude of several key advisors of the prime minister regarding the republican issue and states 
that the Tudeh’s raucous calls for the establishment of a “Democratic Republic” had the effect 
of dissuading many Mosaddeq supporters from pursuing the republican option.5 Drawing on 
interviews with surviving members of the executive bodies of the Tudeh, Maziar Behrooz 
points out the party’s open support for the republic immediately prior to August 19 but makes 
no mention of the content of the communiqués through which such a support was distributed to 
the Tudeh’s large rank and file.6 In his in-depth analysis of the role and agency of clerical 
figures in the pre-coup period, Rahnema touches upon the attitude of religious leaders and 
Mosaddeq advisers regarding the efforts to create a republic in the final days but does not delve 
into the details of the initiative.7 In a little-cited journal article, Shākeri provides deeper insight 
on the Republican Moment, but is hampered by limited access to the relevant sources.8 
Furthermore, none of the works referred to above make detailed reference to the other political 
movements which openly called for the establishment of the republic, nor provide a thorough 
account of the debates on the theme within the upper echelons of the main formation supportive 
of the Prime Minister, the National Front.  
 The aim to redress these partial accounts of the republican initiative and its influence within 
decision-making at the highest political level, informs the present study, which is grounded on 
a close analysis of the political press of the time and the memoirs of both leaders and and rank 
and file members of the multitude of groups then active on the political scene.  
 
The Commemoration of 30 Tir: Mosaddeq at a Critical Institutional Crossroad. The first 
anniversary of the Qiyām-e 30 Tir, or July uprising of 1952, when for the first time politically-
motivated crowds successfully sought to retain an outgoing prime minister, had significant 
consequences in the contention between Mosaddeq and his opponents.  By that point in time, 
attempts to bring about a negotiated settlement of the dispute between the prime minister and 
the growing number of his influential political antagonists had failed and the crisis-ridden 
Seventeenth legislature had entered into a stalemate after the mass resignation of the allies of 
the prime minister, whom had congregated under the Nahzat-e Melli, or National Movement, 
banner. The oil crisis had further been accentuated by the ongoing British embargo. The 
commemoration of the 30 Tir incident would therefore represent a valuable barometer to gauge 
the extent to which Mosaddeq still carried the support of the populace despite prominent 
defections, such as those of Āyatollāh Kāshāni and Mozaffar Baqāʾi, from his own ranks. 
 On 21 July 1953, the main squares of Tehran were filled by the participants to two distinct 
gatherings. In the morning of that day, an organised crowd of Tudeh members and 
sympathisers thronged through the central Sepah square, compelling the New York Times 
correspondent to claim, exaggeratedly, that “Communist partisans, numbering at least 100,000 
persons, were massed in Bahārestān and in the approaching streets as far as the eye could see”.9  
 In the days following the anniversary, the prime minister finalised details for a referendum to 
dissolve the Seventeenth legislature, with which he had progressively developed an unworkable 
relationship. Such an initiative had gained traction in the aftermath of the events surrounding 
the attempt, on 9 Esfand 1331 (28 February 1953), to oust Mosaddeq from the scene. Following 
a dramatic appearance in the Majles floor that day, in which the prime minister proceeded to 
announce that he owed his post to the “people alone, and not to the Parliament or the Shāh”, an 
influential radical weekly close to government circles reported that a referendum was being 
considered to break the impasse.10 In a radio address on 27 July, Mosaddeq finally proceeded to 
state that in any “democratic and constitutional” political system, there could be no law or 
prescription above the “will of the people”. He then proceeded to lambast his adversaries as 
“opponents of the National Movement” who were mainly motivated by their personal interests. 
He then urged the people to vote in favour of the dissolution of the Majles and pledged to end 
his government’s activities if they would express their opposition to the move.11  
 
 The backers of the referendum: From Nahzat-e Melli to Tudeh. The reactions to the prime 
minister’s radio address were indicative of the profound effects that the opposing sides of the 
political spectrum were envisaging for the referendum itself. The widely-read weekly Shuresh, 
which was edited by a zealot supporter of Mosaddeq, proclaimed that the nation was now at the 
threshold of a “great historical test” and stated that the aim of the referendum should extend 
beyond the dissolution of the Majles, to reach the “eradication of the foreigner-worshipping 
monarchy”.12 This view was not dissimilar from the one espoused by the organisations aligned 
to the Tudeh Party, which considered the referendum as a stepping stone towards the creation 
of a Majles-e Moʾassesān, or Constituent Assembly, in order to change the constitution in a 
“completely free and democratic” atmosphere with the aim of “neutralising forever the royal 
court’s capacity to plot against and weaken the progressive nahzat”.13 In a detailed analysis of 
the constitutional powers accorded to the monarch produced on the occasion of the anniversary 
of the Constitutional Revolution, the communist party noted the excessive powers accorded to 
the Shāh by the existing charter and called for limitations to be placed on his ability to interfere 
in both military and civilian affairs through extensive modifications of the same. Amongst 
other requests, the analysis presciently called for the removal of the monarch’s right to dissolve 
parliament, calling it an “insult” to the people.14 Despite pointing out at what it considered to be 
the inadequacies of the existing constitutional charter, the Tudeh did not make an overt call, in 
this instance, for the replacement tout court of the constitutional (mashruteh) state order with a 
republican one. In a sign of wavering postures, the same special issue also approvingly 
reproduced the renowned poet ʿĀref Qazvini’s Ghazal-e Jomhuri, a composition in favour of 
the establishment of a republic composed during the Republican initiative of 1924.    
  
The opposition to the referendum. The anti-Mosaddeq axis spared no rhetorical effort to attack 
the prime minister’s decision, which they immediately considered antithetical to their own key 
interests. The fiercest opposition to the referendum came from Āyatollāh Kāshāni, who 
produced a strongly worded declaration on 29 July which began by claiming that referendums 
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were instruments that applied to “political systems which were bereft of a clear structure and 
constitution […] in our mashruteh system, there are clear rules and regulations governing the 
prime ministership: anyone trespassing these is guilty of treason and may be charged according 
to the law […] the use of the public purse to fund the costs of the referendum is to be 
considered illegal”.15 On the day prior to the first leg of the vote, Kāshāni produced another 
proclamation in which he overtly called for the boycott of the referendum and termed 
participation in the same as harām.16 In a strongly-worded editorial, Baqāʾi made a last appeal 
to the “people of Tehran” whom he termed as “holding  the destiny of the country” in their 
hands, and explained that there was the risk of the “destruction of the 6000-year old nation” if 
the referendum went according to the government’s plan: “the danger does not consist in the 
17th Majles being dissolved, or  handpicked new legislature being created, or the organisation 
of a follow-up referendum, as desired in the Tudeh press, to change the regime through a 
Majles-e Moʾassesān”, but rather, according to the head of the Toilers’ Party, in the possibility 
that the referendum and the mechanism through which it was to be organised - the erection of 
separate polling stations for the “Yes” and “No” votes in different areas of the city - would be 
institutionalised and repeated in the future. Baqāʾi concluded by urging the population of the 
capital to “use any means” to disrupt the referendum. 17 
 Besides witnessing a substantial refusal by public opinion to heed to their calls, the opposition 
leaders also fell short of convincing the leading marjāʿ, Āyatollāh Borujerdi, to accept their 
request to produce a fatwā calling for a boycott of the referendum. The supreme religious figure 
opted instead to reiterate his distance from the political field, thereby depriving the anti-
Mosaddeq camp from strong backing to Kāshāni’s rejection of the referendum on Shi’i 
jurisprudential grounds.18 
  The referendum was held over two separate days, 3 August in Tehran and a week later in the 
rest of the country, and accrued over a million votes in favour of Mosaddeq’s proposal.19 The 
negligible opposition to the government’s plans manifested through the low number of “No” 
votes and the lack of any significant anti-referendum street-level activity during the polling 
considerably strengthened Mosaddeq’s hand. The prime minister now decided to involve the 
Shāh in the ongoing political process, by proceeding to request the convening of elections for 
the new legislature, a prerogative that article 48 of the main text of the constitution accorded to 
the Shāh alone.20 
 
 
The Republican Moment of 16-19 August 1953 
  
The implications of the first overthrow attempt of 16 August. During the evening between 15 
and 16 August, the head of the Imperial Guard, Colonel Neʿmatollāh Nasiri, appeared at 
Mosaddeq’s residence to present the prime minister with the farmān or royal decree, through 
which Mohammad Rezā Pahlavi announced the appointment of Zāhedi as new prime minister. 
Forewarned of Nasiri’s mission, Mosaddeq had him promptly arrested, thereby setting into 
motion the chain of events which would result in the Shāh and the Queen Soraya fleeing to 
Baghdad and Rome. Other officers, who were intent on arresting key members of Mosaddeq’s 
administration, such as the foreign minister and editor of Bākhtar-e Emruz, Hosayn Fātemi, the 
chief of the army staff Taqi Riyāhi and the Iran Party leader Ahmad Zirakzādeh, were also held 
in custody, thereby signalling the failure of the initial effort to unseat the prime minister. 
 The legality of Mosaddeq’s refusal to heed to the farmān has been subject to considerable 
scrutiny. While several commentators and scholars sympathetic to the Shāh’s actions have 
noted that he was legally entitled to replace prime ministers during the fetrat (parliamentary 
recess) period, which they considered to have been started after the collective resignation of the 
Nahzat-e Melli deputies a month earlier, the decree had been delivered prior to either the Shāh 
or the prime minister formally declaring the end of the Seventeenth legislature.21 During his 
military trial in the autumn of 1953, Mosaddeq explained that he had refused to heed to the 
contents of the missive carried by Nasiri because of doubts on the authenticity of the same, 
which stemmed from handwriting irregularities and the fact that the date presented in the 
document was 22 Mordād, or 13 August.22  Despite his deteriorating relationship with the Shāh 
in the aftermath of the 9 Esfand incident, Mosaddeq’s first interpretation of the farmān appears 
to have ultimately been that of a forgery designed to propitiate a military takeover against both 
himself and Mohammad Rezā Pahlavi.  
 At 7am on 16 August, Tehran Radio broadcast a message in which details of Nasiri’s initiative 
were provided but no mention was made of the Shāh’s possible involvement in his attempts or 
the farmān.23 At noon, Fātemi, who also served as the government spokesman, attended a press 
conference in which, when asked to comment on whether the government held the Shāh 
responsible for the attempted overthrow, claimed to be “unaware” of the government’s position 
but had made his own clear through that day’s leading article on Bākhtar-e Emruz. Fātemi’s 
three famous editorials, published in this and the final two issues of the newspaper, accuse the 
Shāh and the royal court of having been in league with the British, plotting constantly against 
Mosaddeq, and having “depleted the wealth of the nation”, but fall short of openly advocating 
the termination of the monarchical state system, a sign that Fātemi was caught between his 
strong animosity towards Mohammad Rezā Pahlavi and Mosaddeq’s reluctance to sever all ties 
with the institutional status quo. 
 While the government formally refrained from engaging in the attribution of responsibility to 
the Shāh, Mosaddeq proceeded with emitting a brief decree - the sole one bearing his personal 
seal after 16 August - dissolving the Majles, which was printed in the evening newspapers of 
the same day. The prime minister attributed such decision to the “will of the people, as 
manifested through the popular vote of the referendum”.  
 
The reaction to the overthrow attempt of 16 August. While the government figures were 
gradually reacting to Nasiri’s coup attempt, the arc of pro-Mosaddeq parties and movements 
were organising at a faster pace at street level, where they could rely upon the experience 
gained in the constant stream series of protests and rallies since the 30 Tir uprising. After an 
initial small demonstration in front of the prime minister’s residence on the morning of 16 
August, the four main allied movements, the Iran Party, the Hezb-e Mardom-e Iran, the Pān-
Irānist, Hezb-e Mellat-e Irān and the Third Force swiftly agreed to congregate in front of the 
parliamentary buildings at Bahārestān Square at 5pm. This meeting was to be the only 
organised gathering held by the pro-government forces prior to the second coup of 19 August. 
In front of what the press unanimously described as a completely full square and with large 
crowds overflowing into the nearby avenues and streets, the prominent former MPs Bāqer Jalāli 
Musavi, Ahmad Razavi, Ahmad Zirakzādeh, ʿAli Shāyegān and the Foreign minister Fātemi all 
delivered fiery speeches attacking the royal court and decrying the coup. The crowd frequently 
interjected with slogans such as “Death to the Treacherous Shāh!”, “We don’t want the Shāh!”, 
“The Coup plotters must be tried and executed!”.24 Despite the agitation, none of the speakers 
proceeded to explicitly announce the end of the monarchy. Both Shāyegān and Fātemi stated 
that the government should now proceed to the creation of a showrā-ye saltanat, or Regency 
Council, and stepped on the borderlines of constitutional provisions, which accorded such a 
right solely to the reigning monarch prior to a trip abroad, as eventually became the case in 
early 1979.  
 The concluding statement of the meeting called upon Mosaddeq to “legally pursue” the coup 
plotters and the fleeing Shāh and to set up a temporary Regency Council in order to determine 
the future of the state system. The Tudeh sympathisers, which had gathered under the banners 
of their main front organisation, the Jamʿiyat-e Melli-ye Mobārezeh bā Esteʿmār (National 
Society Against Colonialism, henceforth known as National Society), congregated instead in 
the nearby Sepah Square, after walking from the congregation point of Kāfe Shahrdāri 
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(presently Tehran City Theatre) and bringing about a three-mile long rally which featured the 
leadership of the Society at its helm. Mobile loudspeakers hastily set up on taxis carried the 
main slogans of the protest, including possibly for the first time “Barchideh Bād Saltanat” (lit. 
the Monarchy must be removed).25 The concluding resolution of the Tudeh gathering called for 
the immediate trial and execution of the coup plotters, the lack of any mercy for the Shāh, who 
was labelled as the “chief organiser” of the coup, and the immediate convening of the Majles-e 
Moʿassesān, which as seen above had been requested by the party prior to the referendum, and 
the dismantlement of the Pahlavi royal court, now considered the “centre of the conspiracy”.  
 
 A mixed reaction. By the evening of 16 August, the initial reaction of the pro-Mosaddeq arc to 
the unfolding events was a varied one. The prime minister’s overall pragmatic stance refrained 
from directly implicating Mohammad Rezā Pahlavi in the attempt to remove him from power 
but also brought an end to the Seventeenth Majles by his own initiative, a move which 
sidestepped the constitutional limitations of his post.  
 Caught between between the need to cater for the growing crowd antagonism to the Shāh and a 
residual attachment to the tenets of the mashruteh state system, the National Front leaders and 
the organs of the aforementioned parties engaged in at times tortuous rhetoric. While reporting 
the Bahārestān resolution to press for the creation of the Regency Council, the organ of the 
Hezb-e Mellat Iran bar Bonyād-e Pān-Iranism, dedicated its main title to what was ostensibly 
the party line: “Mosaddeq is the leader of our nation, which does not want either a royal court 
nor a Parliament”.26 The Hezb-e Mardom-e Iran, which espoused a syncretic fusion between 
socialism and egalitarian Shiism, broke ranks, however, and claimed, in its special issue on 17 
August, that the meetings of the previous afternoon had a clear aim, that of transforming Iran 
into a republic.27 This stance, which is the first public approbatory use of the term jomhuri 
following the Shāh’s escape abroad, came as a confirmation of its previous explicit 
appreciation for republicanism, which had been made in an issue celebrating the formal 
establishment of the republican system in Egypt in the summer of 1953.28 All of these views 
were, however, not endorsed by Mosaddeq, who had yet to pronounce himself on the future 
configuration of the state structure in the wake of the Shāh’s absence. 
  
 The Assault on the Statues. Throughout 17 August, central Tehran was the theatre of a 
sustained effort for the removal of the most glaring public manifestation of Pahlavi rule, the 
imposing statues of Rezā Shāh and his son which stood in the main squares and thoroughfares 
where the crowds supportive of the government had gathered until the previous midnight. 
During his trial, Mosaddeq stated that he had ordered, during that afternoon, for the statues of 
Rezā Shāh to be brought down, after being warned, on the morning of the same day, that “left-
wing extremist parties” were intent on doing so.29 
 Perhaps unbeknownst to the prime minister, the National Front parties had begun such 
operations from the early morning. The central press organ of the Iran Party explains that 
groups of youth members from all the aforementioned National Front parties and groups 
gathered at its headquarters during that morning to be assigned to groups which set out to haul 
the statues down in an orderly manner.30 The Third Force sympathisers, who reached 
Bahārestān Square at 8am in order to start pulling the Rezā Shāh statues down, needed no less 
than four hours to bring down the imposing bronze monument of the founder of the Pahlavi 
dynasty in Sepah Square, the location of the separate Tudeh rally of the previous evening.31  
  Besides being a deeply symbolic gesture of rupture with the much disdained Rezā Shāh 
legacy, the removal of the statues also further confirmed the swiftly vanishing influence of the 
royal court over the fast-paced events which were occurring after the departure of the Shāh, 
whose flight to Baghdad was now well-documented by the Tehran press. After publishing one 
of the earliest press reproductions of the decree appointing Zāhedi, a pro-government afternoon 
daily proclaimed that the unequivocal slogan emerging from the streets was “Mā Shāh 
Nemikhāhim”, or “We don’t want a Shāh”.32  
 
The Tudeh’s Democratic Republic Proclamation. The evening of 17 August presented an 
atmosphere of intense and increasing radicalisation. The crowds which thronged the centre of 
Tehran had developed into an amorphous combination of sympathisers and rank and file 
members of various pro-Mosaddeq parties, the Tudeh and previously unaffiliated bystanders 
who had become increasingly active and were lauded by political organs of all stripes as “the 
heroic people of Tehran” due to their involvement in the impromptu activities against the 
monarchy. Additionally, reports were coming through of similar acts in other major cities, such 
as Isfahan, Tabriz and in the Khuzestān province.33  
After sensing the crowd’s mood, several political groupings decided to break with the frail 
allegiance and re-interpretations of the prescriptions of the Mashruteh constitution and 
proposed instead the termination tout court of the monarchy, in the form of varied 
proclamations in favour of a republican state system. The Tudeh engaged in the most well-
known of these initiatives. Mahmud Zhandi, the editor of the main morning daily of the party, 
recalled that he was part of a three-person group which visited ʿAli Akbar Dehkhodā, the 
celebrated lexicographer who had occasionally voiced support for republicanism in the Sur 
Esrāfil journal he had edited in Switzerland in the early part of the 20th century. Appearing at 
Dehkhodā’s doorstep at dusk on 17 August, the group informed him that Mosaddeq could be 
moving towards the declaration of a republic in the next few days, and urged him to accept 
their invitation to feature as the president of this state system in the making.34 The initiative 
failed, however, as Dekhodā, who had spread out the fiches of his famed encyclopaedic 
dictionary before them, replied that he was immersed in the compilation his lifetime 
achievement and suggested Mosaddeq for the post instead.35  
 At dawn on 18 August, the morning daily affiliated to the Tudeh and the clandestine central 
organ of the party carried an extensive declaration from its Central Committee containing the 
fateful call for the establishment of a “Democratic Republic”, thereby marking the first instance 
of the term jomhuri appearing on the party press.36 The long communiqué, which was the 
Committee’s first formal proclamation since the Shāh’s flight, started by providing an overview 
of the five “coup attempts” which had occurred during the previous twelve months, prior to 
depicting the Shāh as the ringleader of a group of “feudals, landowners and major 
industrialists” who were beholden to the foreign imperialists. It then criticised Mosaddeq for 
possessing too recalcitrant an attitude towards the foreign powers and their domestic agents 
before forcefully claiming that the “removal of the structure of the monarchy” was the only 
option for a conclusive defeat of the current conspiracy and warding off its reoccurrence. It 
then proceeded with the main demand: “The issue of removing the monarchy and creating the 
Democratic Republic must be put to a referendum, and a Majles-e Moʿassesān, convened 
through a free and fair election, should have the goal of modifying and completing the 
constitution”.37 It then ominously warned that anyone who opposed this resolution was to be 
considered an “enemy of the people” and decried any attempt to replace the Shāh with a 
Regency Council or similar as treachery towards national independence. The Tudeh 
communiqué concluded by demanding once again, as it had done on the occasion of the 30 Tir 
and 9 Esfand incidents, the creation of the United Front against Colonialism, and stated that 
there was no requirement for groups and parties to relinquish their existing views and 
ideologies in order to be part of the same. 
 At 11am on 18 August, the central council of the National Society met to prepare and approve 
its own declaration for the republic.38 While reiterating the Tudeh Central Committee’s request 
for the creation of a Democratic Republic through a referendum and the election of a 
constituent assembly, the Society adopted a decidedly more moderate line regarding the 
possible reaction of the government. While noting that Mosaddeq and his ministers would not 
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have immediately accepted such a proclamation, one of the council members noted that it was 
necessary to “convince the government through resistance and perseverance” and pointed out 
that “some of the supporters of the government had been uttering this slogan [the republic] 
from this morning”.39 
 The Society’s communiqué, which was published later that day, reflected this assessment of 
the government’s possible reaction and refrained from containing a directly confrontational 
discourse towards it, as was seen instead in the Central Committee’s declaration.40 It may be 
therefore inferred that the active public presence of the Society leadership, which as seen 
before had taken to the streets from the afternoon of 16 August, contributed to its less rigid 
view, which was different from the Central Committee’s more uncompromising analysis.41 
Both declarations made the establishment of a republic conditional upon approval via 
referendum. Nevertheless, the party began actively engaging in republican slogans and 
presented charts in which the monarchical names of the main avenues and squares of the capital 
were replaced by alternatives in tune with the proposed new state system. The central Shahrezā 
Avenue was renamed Jomhuri, Pahlavi became Mellat, while the Sevvom Esfand (named after 
the date of Rezā Khān’s march on Tehran) was to be known as 30 Tir.42 The sudden 
acceleration of such public manifestations of republicanism by the Tudeh Party was to have, as 
seen below, a significant effect in Mosaddeq’s final deliberations on the issue of the republic. 
 
 Republican Sentiment within the Nahzat-e Melli. Simultaneously to the Tudeh Central 
Committee’s appeal for the establishment of a Democratic Republic, the Third Force party 
newspaper joined Mardom-e Iran in pressing for the transition away from monarchy from 
within the ranks of the Nahzat-e Melli, by claiming that, on the previous evening, the people 
had chanted the following slogan: “Referendum, Republic, Mosaddeq is Victorious”.43 The 
editorial stated that the people of Tehran had exhibited their revulsion to the Pahlavi dynasty’s 
rule through the removal of the statues and that it was now imperative for the government to 
arrange a referendum to modify the state system. The publication confirmed its position the 
following morning. Alongside Mosaddeq’s decree banning any street demonstration, it 
published a long editorial which stated that the proclamation of the Republic, the removal from 
the throne of Mohammad Rezā Pahlavi and the change of the constitution were “unavoidable 
and immediate choices”.44  
 The Third Force appears, however, to have lacked consensus in this decision. According to the 
reminiscences of Amir Pishdād, a high-ranking member, and the court testimony, over a decade 
later, of the party leader Khalil Maleki, the latter had distanced himself from the republican 
initiative, which he deemed too radical and detached from the prime minister’s position, and 
effectively surrendered control over key party instruments, such as its eponymous widely read 
morning daily, to a younger radical flank led by Mohammad ʿAli Khonji and Masoud Hejāzi.45 
These internal divisions were not apparent to outside observers, who could only note the 
championing of the republican cause on 18 and 19 August. 
 The other parties of the pro-Mosaddeq arc presented a more varied support for the republic. On 
its last issue, which was published on the afternoon of August 18, Bākhtar-e Emruz reported 
that youths affiliated to the National Front parties were taking part in the scattered street 
demonstrations by shouting slogans in favour of jomhuriyat, or republicanism, and insisted on 
the establishment of a republican state system during impromptu speeches. The central organ of 
the Iran Party proclaimed the end of the Pahlavi dynasty on 19 August, without however 
venturing into republican lexicon.46 A periodical produced by a more radical faction of the Iran 
Party devoted considerable attention to the republican moment on its last issue. It claimed that 
“the Tudeh, Third Force and 2-3 other parties” had made definitive decisions in support of a 
shift towards a republic, that the same enjoyed “strong support within different social classes” 
but that the prime minister and the Iran Party had yet to become proponents of the change in the 
political system.47  
 It is therefore clear that on the eve of the successful attempt at removing Mosaddeq from 
power, republicanism had gained support within the arc of his supporters and was not limited to 
the ranks of the Tudeh. A further clear indicator of this may be found in the last issue of Hajjār, 
the periodical of an organisation of former Tudeh members led by Anvar Khāmeiʾ and now 
turned into radical opponents of the party. While underscoring the need to adopt the 
referendum as the means to achieve any significant political decision, the publication called for 
a referendum to confirm both the establishment of a republic and Mosaddeq as the raiʾs-e 
qovā-ye mamlekat, or “Head of the Branches of State”.48 
 
The anti-Mosaddeq front’s reaction. The growing calls for the establishment of the republic 
also caused the consternation of the anti-government figures, but did not seemingly elicit a 
formal response from the foremost clerical leaders. Mehdi Haeʾri Yazdi, the son of the founder 
of the Qom seminary system, recalled being summoned to a meeting with Āyatollāh 
Behbahāni, a key leading clerical opposition figure to Mosaddeq, on the morning of 19 August. 
Behbahāni stated then that the flight of the Shāh had led the nation to the brink of destruction 
and the calls for the republic would lead to Iran “falling behind the Iron Curtain” in the near 
future and the marjaʿiyat and all other aspects of the Shi’i religion being under risk of 
dissolution.49 He then pleaded with Haeʾri Yazdi to travel to Qom to “obtain a decree or 
handwritten statement” from Grand Āyatollāh Borujerdi, in order to raise awareness amongst 
the people of the impending communist threat. While expressing readiness to do so, Haeʾri 
Yazdi retorted that, if asked by Borujerdi to provide his own opinion, he would state that he 
believed that the society was not on the brink of being taken over by communism and that “at 
most” Iran would turn into a republic, but did not equate the latter with communism, and 
reminded Behbahāni that even Rezā Shāh had once mulled over the same option. The pleadings 
contained within the newspaper of another religious figure opposed to Mosaddeq, Shams 
Qanātābādi on the morning of 19 August give the impression that Borujerdi was once again 
reticent to intervene on behalf of Kāshāni, Behbahāni and other clerical figures opposed to 
Mosaddeq, and chose instead to await the outcome of this political battle from the sideline.50  In 
an interview with an Egyptian periodical a fortnight after the coup, Kāshāni, who remained 
conspicuously absent from the main political press during the fateful last week of Mordād, 
claimed that Mosaddeq was plotting to establish a republic “from 4 months prior” and that a 
republican state system was not “adequate” for Iran.51 Kāshāni therefore implies that the calls 
for a republic constituted an additional point of rupture between himself and Mosaddeq which 
may have contributed to his lack of support for pro-government forces in the heady mid-August 
period. 
 Another political force long considered to have been part of the CIA’s efforts to overthrow 
Mosaddeq, the Nazi-inspired Sumkā party, also gave consideration to the future structure of the 
state system on 19 August. In a quixotic editorial, after writing off Nasiri’s attempt as a 
“ridiculous coup”, the party organ stated that, just as constitutional monarchy had replaced the 
ancient absolutism fifty years earlier, republicanism was now emerging to supersede the 
existing political order. It then referred positively to the near future, in which the “first 
authority of state” and the “political leader of the nation” would be one and the same.52 
 After initially accusing the prime minister of having engineered the “farcical” coup of 16 
August for the purpose of changing the state system, Shāhed compared Mosaddeq’s decisions 
in the past few days with “Hitler’s burning of the Reichstag” in 1933, implying that both had 
resorted to distracting public opinion in order to achieve covert aims.53 On the morning of 19 
August, the daily’s editorial explained, in its usual lachrymose prose, that Mussolini had a 
crowd “one hundred times the size of those at Mosaddeq’s disposal” when delivering his 
famous speeches from the Medici [sic] square in Rome, and had an “understandable and well-
structured” ideology to present to the masses, prior to accusing the Iranian prime minister of 
       -11- 
“bandying about an illegal government which fooled the nation” into believing it was the 
legitimate one.54 
 According to Wilber’s account, the republican declarations were also seized upon by the 
plotters of the second coup, who masqueraded themselves as Tudeh activists, intent on 
distributing the proclamations to the clergy and other segments of society averse to such a 
development. The assault of these “black crowds” on the headquarters of some of the National 
Front parties,55 damaged the republican cause, for it led to be interpreted, as shall be seen 
below, by Mosaddeq as an intrinsically Tudeh initiative. Such a view was particularly heralded 
by some of the Shāh’s most ardent supporters, who triumphantly proclaimed that the events of 
19 August decisively blocked the possible rise of a republic planned and masterminded by the 
Soviet Ambassador to Tehran, Lavrentiev.56 Nevertheless, anti-republican sentiment did not 
feature explicitly and prominently in the slogans of the groups which took to the streets of 
Tehran and other cities on the day of the coup. As noted in several accounts sympathetic to the 
overthrow of Mosaddeq, the chants which were uttered on that decisive day mostly revolved 
along the pro-Shāh, anti-Mosaddeq axis, therefore only obliquely equating support for the 
retention of Mohammad Rezā Pahlavi’s reign with rejection of the republican commotion 
which had emerged after 16 August.57     
 
Mosaddeq and the Republic 
   
The events of the summer of 1953 occurred at a time when Mosaddeq had progressively 
distanced himself from the Shāh,58 despite never detaching himself from loyalty towards the 
constitutional (mashruteh) state order. In the immediate aftermath of the July 1952 uprising, 
during which societal emotions against the royal family had risen considerably, he attempted to 
assuage the monarch by inscribing a copy of the Quran with the following statement: “I am to 
be considered an enemy of the Quran if I act against the constitution and if I were to accept the 
post of president should the political system be changed into a republic”.59  During an 
important radio address to the nation the prime minister stated however, on 6 April, that the 
monarch, in a constitutional (mashruteh) state order, should “reign, and not rule”, noting that 
the Shāh did not have political duties.60  
The mid-August commotion in the streets and squares of Tehran and other Iranian cities 
occurred at a time when Mosaddeq never left his residence to venture into the public arena. 
Between Nasiri’s visit and the escape from the smoldering ruins of his house in the afternoon of 
19 August, the prime minister chaired a continuous set of meetings and National Front summits 
with advisors and political allies. The diaries and reminiscences of this group provide a 
valuable source for the assessment of the many issues which were on Mosaddeq’s agenda in 
those fateful days, including the future structure of the state system in the wake of the Shāh’s 
departure abroad. 
  Mosaddeq’s first declaration following Nasiri’s initiative consisted in announcing the 
dissolution of the Seventeenth Majles, thereby taking on a prerogative which the constitution, 
and himself, had previously unequivocally assigned to the Shāh. Nevertheless, as the personal 
diaries of Kāzem Hasibi make clear, the issue of the republic took centre stage in the 
discussions at the prime minister’s residence throughout the day on 18 August. An initial 
debate featured three National Front figures (the Iran Party chairman Ahmad Zirakzādeh, the 
foreign minister Fātemi and the prominent former MP Ahmad Razavi) arguing in favour of 
republicanism. Others, who according to Hasibi’s notes included the former minister of 
education and now an ex-MP Karim Sanjābi, the prominent ex-MP ʿAli Shāyegān, presented a 
more moderate stance, which was in tune with Mosaddeq’s own position, but partially 
converged with the first group on the need to consider the Shāh as having resigned from his 
throne, proclaim the eclipse of the Pahlavi dynasty and create a Regency Council.61 At 10am, 
these advisers met with Mosaddeq, who was of the belief that the sole necessary step was the 
creation of the Regency Council and once again reiterated his opposition to the republic, this 
time on the grounds that “the West and the United States still supported this [monarchical] 
regime”, and such a transformation could therefore result in the interruption of their assistance 
and an indication of alignment with the Soviet Union, especially in the wake of the Tudeh 
proclamation for the Democratic Republic. Shortly after this deliberation, Mosaddeq ordered 
the military governor of Tehran to prepare and publish a declaration banning any street 
demonstration until further notice, a development which ensured that the main thoroughfares of 
the capital were bereft of any major pro-government presence on the morning of 19 August.62 
In his memoirs, Mosaddeq specifically refers to the need of quashing the republican fervour as 
the main reason for issuing this order and claimed that he was “against any type of republic, 
democratic or otherwise”.63 
 Besides his previous attachment to the constitution and the monarch, Mosaddeq was therefore 
also swayed by considerations related to Cold War equilibria and his belief that the oil issue 
could not be settled without a continued relationship with the United States. This attitude was, 
however, muted following Mosaddeq’s much-discussed meeting with Loy Henderson, which 
occurred on the afternoon of 18 August.64 The same group of advisors congregated in the 
meantime at Shāyegān’s residence, where a plan for the election of the Regency Council was 
drawn. Mosaddeq conferred with them after meeting Henderson, and according to Hasibi was 
“tired and consternated” by the US Ambassador, who had insisted on declaring Zāhedi as the 
legitimate prime minister and maintained a strenuous support for the Shāh.65 The largely 
negative outcome of this meeting compelled Mosaddeq to agree to organising a referendum on 
the termination of the Pahlavi dynasty and the subsequent creation of a Regency Council via a 
nationwide election.66 The prime minister remained, however, firmly opposed to the 
proclamation of a republic, despite the lingering support from Fātemi and Zirakzādeh.  
 This decision was formally communicated to the Interior minister, Gholām-Hosayn Sadiqi at 
8am on 19 August. Mosaddeq then informed Sadiqi that “since the Shāh had fled the country 
and it was necessary to clarify the legal status of the monarchical institution”, his decision and 
that of a group of “informed figures” was that of a Regency Council be formed through general 
elections, and ordered Sadiqi to instruct the governors of the provinces to prepare for such 
polling.67 When the Interior minister insisted on convening the council of ministers to approve 
the procedures for such an unusual and unprecedented poll, Mosaddeq noted that the group had 
yet to fully conclude its recommendations and exhorted Sadiqi to proceed without delay, only 
to be pre-empted by the events of the following fateful hours. 
  
Conclusion  
   
This article has attempted to provide a more thorough account of one of the less explored 
elements of the events of August 1953 in Iran, the brief but spirited republican initiatives which 
immediately preceded the fall of Mosaddeq’s government. In the space of a few days, the latter 
was confronted with a set of challenges which were the product of the period of intra-
institutional struggle inaugurated by his decision to suspend the elections for the Seventeenth 
Majles. His long and unfinished tussle with parliament ultimately resulted, however, in the 
Shāh deeming the chamber to be in a state of “incapacity”, a circumstance which favoured the 
decreeing of the farmāns which set into motion the first failed attempt to unseat the prime 
minister.  
 The available evidence suggests that all the political movements which produced overt 
proclamations in favour of a transition to a republican state order did so after observing the 
initial reactions of the public to the first attempt to unseat Mosaddeq on 16 August. Politically 
assertive and experienced crowds had become an increasingly significant element of the 
political contention since their decisive role in restoring Mosaddeq to power during the July 
uprising of 1952 and readily flocked to the main theatres of street politics from the afternoon of 
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16 August onwards.  By the evening of the following day, a distinct popular sentiment in 
favour of a transition towards a republic was acknowledged and reported by those political 
groups which had maintained a constant and prominent presence in the numerous rallies and 
demonstrations of that period. After first being reflected by the organ of the Khodāparastān-e 
Sosiālist movement, which had previously made its support for republicanism known, several 
political newspapers simultaneously reflected such a mood on the morning of 18 August, when 
they explicitly called for the final dissolution of the monarchy and distanced themselves from 
the prime minister’s gradualist and cautious approach to the institutional quandary.  
 Despite making a clear and overt use of the term jomhuri, neither the Third Force nor the 
Tudeh proposed an institutional blueprint or structure for this new state system, thereby 
implying that their calls were deriving from a desire to assert themselves at the helm of a 
spontaneous republican tendency, rather than the resurfacing of structured republican thought 
conceived and developed over time. Much like the predecessor episode of 1924 and the 
successful move towards a republic in 1978-79, the Moment of 1953 did not present at its core 
a cogent thought-process, and was rather the consequence of the sudden weakening, within 
both public opinion and the political sphere, of the influence and appeal of the monarchy. It 
therefore did not contribute to uniting the anti-Shāh forces, but rather introduced a further 
element of contrast and dissonance within them. 
 With the streets of Tehran and other major cities under the sway of a varied and chaotic mix of 
sympathisers and rank and file members of various parties, bystanders and “black crowds”, 
Mosaddeq was increasingly under pressure to resolve the latest chapter in his struggle to 
establish governmental authority either by siding with one of the crowds’ emerging demands - 
the creation of a republic - or a continuation of the frail mashruteh edifice. His reluctance to 
offer clear judgement on the issue until the afternoon of 18 August, when he effectively acted 
against the republican initiatives by ordering the cessation of all street demonstrations, sent his 
supporters in further disarray, as it ran counter to his previous support for the defacement of the 
statues of Rezā Shāh. The attitude had led some of the forces loyal to him, such as the Third 
Force, and even elements within the Tudeh Party to believe that the prime minister was 
beginning to detach himself from loyalty to the monarchy. Mosaddeq became, however, wary 
of all calls for the establishment of a Republic after learning of the Tudeh’s proclamation of the 
Democratic Republic. His reaction to the same highlighted the two sides’ fragile and 
detrimental relationship, which was grounded on the party’s caustic view of the prime minister 
and its wavering support for him at the apexes of his confrontation with the royal court. These 
factors would ultimately cause the complete dissolution of any possibility of trust and 
cooperation between them at a moment of maximum practical need for such a synergy.  
 Besides the impact of his previous anti-republican sentiment, the prime minister’s order to 
clear the streets was brought about by his seemingly Cold War-motivated concern for the 
Western reaction to the creation of a republic, which he thought would have been interpreted as 
an alignment towards the Soviet Union and therefore scupper the possible cooperation of the 
West in the resolution of the oil issue. This conclusion also entailed a reversal of the attitude 
Mosaddeq had maintained during the July uprising of the previous year, when he refrained 
from thwarting or lessening the impact of the crowds’ sustained agency and aims.   
 By the morning of 19 August, the disarray caused by the differing and widely contrasting 
views and rhetoric espoused by different sets of actors - Mosaddeq, the National Front rank and 
file, the Tudeh and the radicalised crowds - on this key institutional issue played into the hands 
of the royalist conspirators, who succeeded in setting forth in their new plan to take over the 
key government and political installations.  
  The pro-Shāh initiatives which led to the ousting of Mosaddeq put a sudden end to the 
Republican Moment of 1953. In its first reaction to the coup, the Central Committee of the 
Tudeh Party swiftly cast aside its support for the political system it had so prominently 
heralded two days earlier and called instead for all anti-court elements, including its most 
ardent detractors, such as the Pan-Iranists and the Third Force, to form a joint front to oppose 
the coup regime.68 Caught in the whirlwind of the rapidly-unfolding events, the calls for 
republicanism suddenly lost priority, replaced as they were by the exigency of swiftly mounting 
a reaction to the success on the ground of the monarchist forces and their foreign allies. 
 Notwithstanding their temporal brevity, the circumstances surrounding the calls for the 
republic in August 1953 are, as this study has striven to show, an important component in the 
narrative of one of the more momentous episodes of modern Iranian history, contributing, on a 
broader level, to a better understanding of the relationship between political leaders and crowds 
supportive of them, of decision-making in political circles which presented a strongly 
charismatic leadership, such as the one of Mohammad Mosaddeq, and of the elusive and 
mercurial nature of republicanism in the decades prior to the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic in 1979. 
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47. Parkhāsh, 28 Mordād 1332 [19 August 1953]. 
48. Sedā-ye Enqelāb (Hajjār), 28 Mordād 1332 [19 August 1953]. 
49. “Interview with Mehdi Haeʾri-Yazdi”, The Harvard Iranian Oral History Project, Tape 
Transcript No.2, 4. The Wilber report, as available on http://cryptome.org/cia-iran-all.htm, 
notes that Behbahāni had been enlisted to travel to Qom to obtain such an edict from Borujerdi, 
but refrains from claiming that he was successful. 
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50. Qanātābādi pleaded with Borujerdi to break his silence on 19 August, as he decried Tehran 
to be “in the hands of the Bolsheviks” and the statues of the Pahlavi monarchs as being due for 
replacement with those of Lenin, Stalin and Malenkov. See in this regard Mellat-e Mā, 28 
Mordād 1332 [19 August 1953] and its leading article, “Jomhuri-ye Mosaddeq”. As seen 
above, the Tudeh actively refrained from implementing such moves. 
51. Interview with Al-Masri, as reproduced in Dehnavi [Ed], Kāshāni, 4, 27-29. 
52. Pāymardi, 28 Mordād 1332 [19 August 1953]. The Sumkā was not wholly committed to the 
anti-Mosaddeq initiative until late that day, when its leader, Mahmud Monshizādeh, emerged 
from prison to rally his party members. See in this regard ʿAzizi, “Har Che”, Sharq, 14 and 
Rahnema, Coup, 191. 
53. Shāhed published the text of the farmān on 18 August and a photo static reproduction the 
following day. 
54. Shāhed, 28 Mordād 1332 [19 August 1953]. Baqāʾi’s daily dedicated much of its efforts in 
those days to re-asserting the illegality of Mosaddeq’s decisions, rather than countering the 
growing republican demands. 
55. See for example Āpādānā, 28 Mordād 1332 [19 August 1953] for the Hezb-e Mellat Bar 
Bonyād-e Pān-Iranism communiqué regarding the supposed Tudeh attack on its headquarters, 
which occurred “under the gaze of a truck full of soldiers”. This latter detail, and the lack of 
any reference to such attacks in the Tudeh press indicates their likely occurrence without the 
knowledge of the party leadership. 
56. Leading article in Ātash, 29 Mordād 1332 [20 August 1953], a newspaper edited by a 
firebrand royalist, Sayyed Mahdi Mir-Ashrāfi. 
57. See in this regard Dād, 29 Mordād 1332 [20 August 1953], Atābaki and Bani-Ahmad, 
Rastākhiz, 188-195, Tehran Mosavvar, 30 Mordād 1332 [21 August 1953]. There is evidence, 
reproduced in Rahnema, Coup, 169-170, pointing to a direct nexus between the decision of at 
least a few downtown athletes and street toughs to enter the fray on 19 August and the 
republican initiatives of the previous days, but the extent to which this correlation was 
widespread is yet to be ascertained. 
58. As noted in Rahnema, Mazhabi, 261, the prime minister had ceased visiting the Shāh in the 
aftermath of the 9 Esfand incident, despite attempts by both his son and the monarch to favour 
a reconciliation.  
59. Mosaddeq, Khāterāt, 260. This act was first revealed in the radio broadcast discussed 
immediately below.  
60. Text of radio broadcast in Kayhān, 17 Farvardin 1332 [6 April 1953]. 
61. Hasibi’s notes as reproduced in Movahhed, Naft, 2,812. 
62. The order was published on the same afternoon in the evening dailies, such as Ettelāʿāt and 
Bākhtar-e Emruz. 
63. Mosaddeq, Khāterāt, 272. He also specifies that he was still attempting at this stage to 
convince the Shāh to return to the country, and that the Regency Council would be formed only 
if this would have failed. 
64. Henderson’s telegram to Washington describing this meeting, Foreign Relations of the 
United States of America, Vol. X, 748-752. 
65. Hasibi’s notes in Movahhed, Khāb, 2,813. His description closely matches the content of 
Henderson’s telegram. 
66. Ibid. The Tudeh supporters had increased their public support for republicanism 
considerably in the afternoon and evening of August 18. See Kayhān, 29 Mordād 1332 [20 
August 1953] for a description of the tussles between the armed forces and Tudeh youths then 
celebrating the Democratic republic in Sepah Square.  
67. Sadiqi, “28 va 29 Mordād”, 120. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
68. Tudeh Central Committee’s Proclamation, 29 Mordād 1332 [20 August 1953], as 
reproduced in Ettehād-e Mardom, 10 Esfand 1360 [1 March 1982]. 
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